Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:49 pm
Time: 10:49 pm
Results for political patronage
1 results foundAuthor: Tepe, Markus Title: Cops for Hire? The Political Economy of Police Employment in the German States Summary: In times of an alleged waning of political business cycles and partisan policymaking, vote-seeking policymakers can be expected to shift the use of political manipulation mechanisms towards other policy domains in which the macro-institutional environment allows them greater leverage. Public employment generally, and police employment specifically, are promising domains for such tactics. Timing the hiring of police officers during election periods may increase votes, as these are 'street-visible' jobs dealing with politically salient issues. Law-and-order competence signaling makes police hiring especially attractive for conservative parties. Testing these electioneering and partisanship hypotheses in the German states between 1992 and 2010, we find that socio-economic variables such as population density strongly determine police employment. But incumbents also hire more police officers before elections, while conservative party power increases police numbers. Subjectively 'immediate' forms of crime (issue salience) and perceived causes of crime such as immigration are also positively associated with police numbers. Details: Unpublished paper, 2012. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031003 Year: 2012 Country: Germany URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031003 Shelf Number: 135801 Keywords: Crime ReductionHiring PracticesPolice Recruitment and SelectionPolicingPolitical Patronage |